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1Massive MIMO Pilot Retransmission Strategies for
Robustification against Jamming
Tan Tai Do, Hien Quoc Ngo, Trung Q. Duong, Tobias J. Oechtering, and Mikael Skoglund
Abstract—This letter proposes anti-jamming strategies based
on pilot retransmission for a single user uplink massive MIMO
under jamming attack. A jammer is assumed to attack the system
both in the training and data transmission phases. We first
derive an achievable rate which enables us to analyze the effect
of jamming attacks on the system performance. Counter-attack
strategies are then proposed to mitigate this effect under two
different scenarios: random and deterministic jamming attacks.
Numerical results illustrate our analysis and benefit of the
proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an emerging candidate for 5G wireless communication
networks, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [1,
2] has drawn a lot of research interests recently. However,
there are only a few works on physical layer security in this
area [3–9]. Among the very few, only some of them have
studied jamming aspects although jamming exists and has been
identified as a critical problem for reliable communications,
especially in massive MIMO systems, which are sensitive to
pilot contamination [1]. For instance, the authors consider se-
curity transmission for a downlink massive MIMO system with
presence of attackers capable of jamming and eavesdropping
in [6, 7]. The problem of smart jamming is considered for
an uplink massive MIMO system in [8], which shows that a
smart jammer can cause pilot contamination that substantially
degrades the system performance.
Most of the above works have been considered from a
jammer point of view: study the jamming strategy, which is the
most harmful for the legitimate user or for the eavesdropper. In
this work, we motivate our study from the system perspective,
in which we develop counter strategies to minimize the effect
of jamming attacks. To this end, we first derive an achievable
rate of a single user uplink massive MIMO with the presence
of a jammer. Then, by exploiting asymptotic properties of mas-
sive MIMO systems, we propose two anti-jamming strategies
based on pilot retransmission protocols for the cases of random
jamming and deterministic jamming attacks. Numerical results
show that the proposed anti-jamming strategies can signifi-
cantly improve the system performance.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a single user massive MIMO uplink with the
presence of a jammer as depicted in Fig. 1. Further, we assume
that the base station (BS) has M antennas, the legitimate user
and the jammer have a single antenna.
Let us denote gu ∈ CM×1 and gj ∈ CM×1 as the channel
vectors from the user and the jammer to the BS, respec-
tively. We assume that the elements of gu are independent
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Fig. 1. Massive MIMO uplink with jamming attack.
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero mean circularly sym-
metric complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG) random variables, i.e.,
gu ∼ CN (0, βuIM ), where βu represents the large-scale
fading (path loss and shadowing). Similarly, we assume that
gj ∼ CN (0, βjIM ) and is independent of gu.
We consider a block-fading model, in which the channel
remains constant during a coherence block of T symbols, and
varies independently from one coherence block to the next. To
communicate with the BS, the legitimate user follows a two-
phase TDD transmission protocol: i) Phase 1: the user sends
pilot sequences to the BS for channel estimation, and ii) Phase
2: the user transmits the payload data to the BS. We assume
that the jammer attacks the uplink transmission both in the
training and in the data payload transmission phases.
A. Training phase
During the first τ channel uses (τ < T), the user sends
to the BS a pilot sequence √τptsu, where pt is the transmit
pilot power and su ∈ Cτ×1 originates from a pilot codebook S
containing τ orthogonal unit-power vectors. At the same time,
the jammer sends √τqtsj to interfere the channel estimation,
where sj ∈ Cτ×1 satisfies E{‖sj‖2} = 1 and qt is the transmit
power of the jammer during the training phase. Accordingly,
the received signals at the BS is given by
Yt =
√
τptgusTu +
√
τqtgjsTj + Nt, (1)
where Nt ∈ CM×τ is the additive noise matrix with unit power
i.i.d. ZMCSCG elements.
The BS then performs a de-spreading operation as:
yt = Yts
∗
u =
√
τptgu +
√
τqtgjsTj s
∗
u + n˜t, (2)
where n˜t , Nts∗u and n˜t ∼ CN (0, IM ). The minimum mean
squared error (MMSE) estimate of gu given yt is [10]
gˆu = cuyt, (3)
where cu =
√
τptβu
τptβu+τqtβj |sTj s∗u |2+1
.
The MMSE estimator (3) requires that the BS has to know
βu, βj, and |sTj s∗u |. Since βu and βj are large-scale fading
coefficients which change very slowly with time (some 40
times slower than the small-scale fading coefficients), they
can be estimated at the BS easily [11]. The quantity |sTj s∗u |
2includes the jamming sequence sj which is unknown at the BS.
However, by exploiting asymptotic properties of the massive
MIMO, the BS can estimate |sTj s∗u | from the received pilot
signal Yt . We will discuss about this in detail in Section IV-A.
Let eu = gu − gˆu be the channel estimation error. From
the properties of MMSE estimation, gˆu and eu are indepen-
dent. Furthermore, we have gˆu ∼ CN (0, γuIM ) and eu ∼
CN (0, (βu − γu)IM ), where
γu ,
τpt β2u
τpt βu + τqt βj |sTj s∗u |2 + 1
= cu
√
τpt βu. (4)
B. Data transmission phase
During the last (T − τ) channel uses, the user transmits
the payload data to the BS and the jammer continues to
interfere with its jamming signal. Let xu (E{‖xu‖2} = 1) and
xj (E{‖xj‖2} = 1) be the transmitted signals from the user and
the jammer, respectively. The BS receives
yd =
√
pdguxu +
√
qdgjxj + nd, (5)
where pd and qd are the transmit powers from the user and
jammer in the data transmission phase, respectively. The noise
vector nd is assumed to have i.i.d. CN (0, 1) elements.
To estimate xu, the BS performs the maximal ratio combin-
ing based on the estimated channel gˆu as follow
y = gˆHu yd =
√
pd gˆHu guxu +
√
qdgˆHu gjxj + gˆ
H
u nd . (6)
III. ACHIEVABLE RATE AND IMPACT OF JAMMING ATTACK
In order to analyze the impact of jamming attack on the
system, we derive a capacity lower bound (achievable rate) for
the massive MIMO channel, described as in (6). Substituting
gu = gˆu + eu into (6), we have
y=
√
pd ‖gˆu‖2xu +
√
pd gˆHu euxu +
√
qd gˆHu gjxj + gˆ
H
u nd . (7)
Since y consists of the signals associated with the channel
uncertainty and jamming, we derive an achievable rate using
the method suggested in [12]. To this end, we decompose the
received signal in (7) as
y =
√
pdE{‖gˆu‖2}xu+ (8)√
pd (‖gˆu‖2−E{‖gˆu‖2}+ gˆHu eu)xu+
√
qd gˆHu gjxj + gˆ
H
u nd .︸                                                                     ︷︷                                                                     ︸
, neff − effective noise
Since neff and the desired signal are uncorrelated, we can
obtain an achievable rate by treating neff as the worst-case
Gaussian noise, which can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 1. An achievable rate of the massive MIMO
channel with jamming is
R = (1 − τ/T ) log2 (1 + ρ) , (9)
where ρ is the effective SINR, given by
ρ =
Mpdγu
pd βu + qd βj + M qdqtpt
(
βj
βu
)2 |sT
j
s∗u |2γu + 1
. (10)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Two interesting remarks can be made:
(i) If the jammer does not attack during the training phase
(qt = 0) or sj and su are orthogonal (sTj s∗u = 0), the
achievable rate becomes
R =
(
1 − τ
T
)
log2
(
1 +
Mpdγu
pd βu + qd βj + 1
) M→∞→ ∞. (11)
The achievable rate increases without bound as M → ∞,
even when the jammer attacks during the data transmis-
sion phase.
(ii) If the jammer attacks during the training phase and sTj s∗u ,
0, we have
R
M→∞→
(
1 − τ
T
)
log2
*
,
ptpd
qtqd
β2u
β2
j
1
|sT
j
s∗u |2
+
- . (12)
This implies that when the training phase is attacked, the
achievable rate is rapidly saturated even when M → ∞.
This is the effect of jamming-pilot contamination.
IV. PILOT RETRANSMISSION SCHEME
As discussed in Section III, the jamming attack during
the training phase highly affects the system performance.
Therefore, we focus on the training phase and construct
counter strategies to mitigate the effect of jamming-pilot con-
tamination. We propose pilot retransmission schemes where
the pilot will be retransmitted when the jamming-pilot con-
tamination is high (|sTj s∗u | is large). Note that, some overheads
for synchronization are necessary for the pilot retransmission
protocols. However, those overheads are negligible compared
to the payload data.
A. Mathematical Preliminaries
We show that by exploiting asymptotic properties of the
massive MIMO system, the BS can estimate |sTj s∗u | and s∗j sTj
from the received pilot signals yt and Yt even sj is unknown.
1) Estimation of |sTj s∗u |2: By the law of large numbers,
1
M
‖yt ‖2= τpt
‖gu‖2
M
+ τqt |sTj s∗u |2
‖gj‖2
M
+
‖n˜t ‖2
M
+
√
τpt
gHu
(√
τqtgjsTj s
∗
u + n˜t
)
M
+
√
τqtsTu s
∗
j
gHj
(√
τptgu + n˜t
)
M
+
n˜Ht
(√
τptgu +
√
τqtgjsTj s
∗
u
)
M
a.s.→ τpt βu + τqt |sTj s∗u |2 βj + 1, as M → ∞, (13)
where
a.s.→ denotes almost sure convergence. From (13), and
under the assumption that the BS knows βu and βj, |sTj s∗u |2
can be estimated asF|sT
j
s∗u |2 =
1
τqt M βj
‖yt ‖2 −
pt βu
qt βj
− 1
τqt βj
. (14)
2) Estimation of s∗j sTj : From (1) and again from the law of
large numbers, as M → ∞, we have
1
M
YHt Yt
a.s.→ τpt βus∗usTu + τqt βjs∗j sTj + Iτ . (15)
Thus, the BS can estimate s∗j s
T
j as
ŝ∗
j
sT
j
=
1
τqt βjM
YHt Yt −
pt βu
qt βj
s∗us
T
u −
1
τqt βj
Iτ . (16)
Based on the estimates of |sTj s∗u |2 and s∗j sTj , in next sections,
we propose two pilot retransmission schemes to deal with two
common jamming cases: random and deterministic jamming.
3B. Pilot Retransmission under Random Jamming
In practice, if the jammer does not have the prior knowledge
of the pilot sequences used by the user, then it will send a
random sequence to attack the system. During the training
phase, the user sends a pilot sequence su ∈ S, while the
jammer sends a random jamming sequence. The BS estimates
|sTj s∗u |2 and requests the user to retransmit a new pilot sequence
until |sTj s∗u |2 is smaller than a threshold ε or the number of
transmissions exceeds the maximum number Nmax. The pilot
retransmission algorithm is summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1 (Under random jamming).
1. Initialization: set N = 1, choose the values of pilot length
τ, threshold ε, and Nmax (Nmaxτ < T).
2. User sends a random τ × 1 pilot sequence su ∈ S.
3. The BS estimates |sTj s∗u |2 using (14). If |sTj s∗u |2 ≤ ε or
N = Nmax → Stop. Otherwise, go to step 4.
4. Set N = N + 1, go to step 2.
Let su(n) and sj(n) be the pilot and jamming sequences
respectively, corresponding to the nth retransmission, n =
1, ..., N . Similar to (9), the achievable rate of the massive
MIMO with anti-jamming for random jamming is given by
Rrj =
(
1− Nτ
T
)
log2
(
1 +
Mpdγu
pd βu + qd βj + αrj + 1
)
, (17)
where αrj = M qdqtpt
β2
j
β2u
min
n
|sj(n)T su(n)∗ |2γu. Note that in
order to realize the achievable rate Rrj in (17), the BS has to
buffer the received pilot signal then processes with the best one
(with minimal |sj(n)T su(n)∗ |2) after N pilot retransmissions.
There exists case where |sj(1)T su(1)∗ |2 is minimum which
degrades the system performance since it consumes more
training resource without finding a better candidate. However,
the pilot is only retransmitted when the first transmission
is bad, and hence, there will be a high probability that the
retransmission is better than the first one.
C. Pilot Retransmission under Deterministic Jamming
Next, we assume that the jamming sequences are determin-
istic during the training phase, i.e., sj(1) = · · · = sj(N ). Such
scenario can happen, for instance, in case the jammer has
the prior knowledge of the pilot length and pilot sequence
codebook and tries to attack using a deterministic function
of those training sequences [7]. In this case, the massive
MIMO system can outsmart the jammer by adapting the
training sequences based on the knowledge on the current pilot
transmission instead of just randomly retransmitting them as
in the previous case.
We observe that |sTj s∗u |2 can be decomposed as
|sTj s∗u |2 = sTu s∗j sTj s∗u. (18)
So, if the BS knows s∗j s
T
j , it can choose su to minimize |sTj s∗u |.
In Section IV-A2, we know that the BS can estimate s∗j s
T
j
from Yt . From this observation, we propose the following pilot
retransmission scheme:
Algorithm 2 (Under deterministic jamming).
1. Initialization: choose the values of pilot length τ and
threshold ε.
2. User sends a τ × 1 pilot sequence su ∈ S.
3. The BS estimates |sTj s∗u |2 using (14). If |sTj s∗u |2 ≤ ε →
Stop. Otherwise, go to step 4.
4. The BS estimates s∗j sTj using (16). Then, the BS finds
s
opt
u so that s
optT
u s
∗
j s
T
j s
opt∗
u is minimal. If soptTu s∗j sTj sopt∗u <
|sTj s∗u |2, then the user will retransmit this new pilot.
Since the BS requests the user to retransmit its pilot only
if |sTj s∗u | of the first transmission exceeds the threshold ε, the
achievable rate is
Rdj=
(
1− Nτ
T
)
log2
(
1+
Mpdγu
pd βu + qd βj + αdj + 1
)
, (19)
where

αdj = M qdqtpt
(
βj
βu
)2 |sTj s∗u |2γu, N = 1, if |sTj s∗u | ≤ ε
αdj = M qdqtpt
(
βj
βu
)2 |sTj sopt∗u |2γu, N = 2, otherwise.
The maximal number of retransmissions for this case is one.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of
the proposed anti-jamming schemes in term of the average
achievable rate. The average is taken over 50000 realizations
of (su, sj). We assume that the transmit powers at the user and
jammer satisfy τpt+(T−τ)pd ≤ T P and τqt+(T−τ)qd ≤ TQ.
We also assume T = 200 channel uses, maximum number of
transmissions Nmax = 2.
Fig. 2 illustrates the average achievable rates for different
anti-jamming schemes according to the training payload (τ/T).
It shows that in order to achieve the best performances,
the training payloads should be selected properly to balance
the channel estimation quality (τ is large enough) and the
resource allocated for data transmission (τ is not too large).
As expected, the proposed schemes with pilot retransmission
outperform the conventional scheme (without pilot retransmis-
sion). When the training sequence is very long, i.e., τ/T is
large, the proposed schemes are close to the conventional one
since the probability of pilot retransmission is very small as
the channel estimation quality is often good enough after the
first training transmission. Note that in this simulation, we
choose ε = 0.1 which is not optimal in general. It is expected
that the benefits of the our proposed schemes are even larger
with optimal ε.
Figure 3 shows the average achievable rates versus the
number of BS antennas. Without anti-jamming strategy, the
pilot contamination can severely harm the system performance
and obstruct the scaling of achievable rate with M . This is
consistent with our analysis in Section III. The performance
can be remarkably improved by using the pilot retransmission
protocols. Particularly, for the case of deterministic jamming,
the proposed scheme can overcome the pilot contamination
bottleneck and allows the achievable rates scale with M even
when M is large.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of anti-jamming for a single-user uplink mas-
sive MIMO has been considered. It showed that jamming
attacks could severely degrade the system performance. By
exploiting the asymptotic properties of large antenna array,
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Fig. 2. Average achievable rates of different anti-jamming schemes for ε =
0.1, qt = pt = qd = pd = SNR, M = 50. The solid curves, dotted curves
(with label “RJ”), and dashed curves (with label “DJ”) denote the achievable
rates without pilot retransmission (c.f. Proposition 1), with counter strategy
for random jamming (c.f. Alg. 1), and with counter strategy for deterministic
jamming (c.f. Alg. 2), respectively.
we proposed two pilot retransmission protocols. With our
proposed schemes, the pilot sequences and training payload
could flexibly be adjusted to reduce the effect of jamming
attack and improve the system performance.
Future work may study multi-user networks. For instance,
our results can be readily extended if a max-min fairness
criterion is used. Then the pilot retransmission protocol design
is considering the worst user who has the smallest achievable
rate.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
By treating neff as Gaussian additive noise, an achievable
rate of the channel in (8) is given by
R =
(
1 − τ
T
)
log2
(
1 +
pd |E{‖gˆu‖2}|2
E{|neff |2}
)
. (20)
Let us define
ρ ,
pd |E{‖gˆu‖2}|2
E{|neff |2}
,
pdM2γ2u
E1 + E2 + E3
, (21)
where E1 , pdE
{‖gˆu‖2 − E {‖gˆu‖2} + gˆHu eu2
}
, E2 ,
qdE
{gˆHu gj2
}
, and E3 , E
{
|gˆHu nd |2
}
. Since gˆu and eu are
independent zero mean random vectors, we have
E1 = pdE{‖gˆu‖4} − pd (E{‖gˆu‖2})2 + qdE{|gˆHu eu |2}
= pdM (M + 1)γ2u − pdM2γ2u + pdMγu(βu − γu)
= Mγupd βu. (22)
From (3), and using the fact that gu, gj, n˜t are independent
and zero mean random vectors, we have
E2 = qdc2uE
{√τptgHu gj + √τqt ‖gj‖2sTu s∗j + n˜Ht gj2
}
(a)
= qdc2u
(
τptE
{gHu gj2
}
+τqt |sTu s∗j |2E{‖gj‖4}+E
{n˜Ht gj2
})
= qdc2u (τpt M βu βj + τqt M (M + 1) β2j |sTu s∗j |2 + M βj).
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Then by using (4),
E2 = Mqdγu *,βj + Mγu
qt
pt
β2j
β2u
|sTj s∗u |2+- . (23)
Similarly,
E3 = E{|gˆHu nd |2} = Mγu. (24)
Substituting (22), (23), and (24) into (21) we obtain (9).
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